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A Response to Professor Bix
ROBERT F. NAGEL*
In asking what special expertise lawyers and legal academics might
bring to bear on current debates about marriage, Professor Bix raises an
important and often overlooked question. To be clear, I do not take him
to be questioning whether particular lawyers-say, the individuals
contributing to this symposium-might have useful insights on the subject.
Any person, whether legally trained or not, might happen to have
significant moral, scientific, or practical knowledge.I Rather, the issue is
whether, as a general matter, legal professionals have qualifications that
would justify their exercising any extra degree of influence over public
debate and decision making regarding marriage.
Professor Bix considers various possible types of legal expertise,
including knowledge of relevant laws, skill at constructing legal
formulations, knowledge of legal norms and practices (including the
nature of state interests), and the ability to utilize historical or economic
analysis.2 His conclusion is that while legal thinkers have useful expertise
on certain aspects of the marriage issue, these aspects constitute only a
small part of the overall set of relevant considerations. 3 On some of the
most important matters, they have no more, and sometimes they have
less, expertise than others.4
* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado
School of Law.
1. In my opinion, Professor Bix focuses too heavily on the kinds of expert
knowledge that legal thinkers do not possess and not enough on the kind of
commonsensical knowledge that they do not possess, but this problem does not affect the
point I wish to develop in this Comment. Brian Bix, Everything I Know about Marriage
I Learned from Law Professors, 42 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 824, 824-26 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 826.
4. Id. at 829-32.
While this is a valuably humbling conclusion, Professor Bix is too
kind. To see why the situation is considerably worse than depicted in his
admirable paper, it is only necessary to exercise the kind of expertise
that we legal academics do have, or at least should have. What we do
for a living, after all, is train lawyers and study the nature of the legal
process. At a minimum, then, our professional expertise is in understanding
how lawyers think and act.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to acknowledge that lawyers
think and act in a vast range of ways. As the principal paper shows, we
utilize intellectual methods as diverse as common law formalism, imaginative
story telling, and hard-nosed economic analysis. 5 Moreover, we act as
calm and trusted advisors, as cutthroat advocates, and sometimes as
moral oracles. Despite this variety, there are certain underlying mental
and behavioral characteristics that can be expected to shape the kind of
influence that lawyers will exercise on the marriage debate. Here I shall
describe only two of the most obvious.
First, lawyers think and communicate in a relatively professionalized
vocabulary. Whether this vocabulary consists of arcane terms like stare
decisis or somewhat more familiar doctrinal phrases like strict scrutiny,
it is a vocabulary about which lawyers claim to have specialized knowledge.
To the extent this claim is accurate, solutions crafted by lawyers on an
issue like marriage will be shaped by and will be expressed in a
language that is relatively alien to the general public.6 This means that
lawyers' influence will ultimately make the institution of marriage less
intuitively understandable to the people whose lives are affected. It also
means that legalistic reforms will tend not to reflect whatever wisdom
and experience is inherent in the common language.
Second, the central intellectual focus of legal education and one of the
central activities of the legal profession is participation in adversarial
argumentation. This simple fact has a number of ramifications for the
way lawyers are inclined to approach social issues. For one thing, the
intellectual world of the lawyer rests on the fault line of contested
meaning. Thus, without thinking about it much, lawyers tend to see
understanding and wisdom as malleable, as the result of argumentation
rather than fact or practice.7 We overestimate language and underestimate
behavior. We do not have the normal inhibitions against untested
change because a large part of our job is to destabilize and shift settled
understandings.
5. Id. at 829-32.
6. This theme is developed in ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES:
THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 140-41 (1989) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES].
7. Id. at 7-12.
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For another thing, lawyers' thinking tends uncritically to accept many
of the deficiencies of uninhibited argument. We are notorious for
exaggerating and simplifying historical evidence, for example. We often
adopt a condemning tone.' We are inclined to overstate what is at
stake. 9 Because we are so frequently engaged in proving a point, we
concentrate on what can be conclusively demonstrated and we either
ignore what is conjectural (but possibly important) or convince ourselves
somehow that it is more certain than it is.'" What is perplexing and even
mysterious in our hands vanishes or is transformed into the definite.
And we operate by way of indirection: we insist our objectives are quite
limited when in fact they are quite ambitious. I
All this means that even where legally trained individuals can claim
some special expertise, their impact on debate and decision-making is
likely to be destructive. For example, consider Professor Bix's suggestion
that lawyers' familiarity with legal analysis and case law might enable
them to make some useful contributions to an understanding of the state's
interests in marriage.1 2 It seems more likely that legal thinkers will distort
and impoverish public debate about the nature and importance of those
interests. Consider the Supreme Court's treatment of the interest a state
might have in racial diversity within the student body of its law school.13
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court described that interest at length and
declared it to be "compelling" in the sense that term is used in the relevant
constitutional decisions.' 4  The Court claimed that the law school's
interest was in educational enrichment, an effective labor force, and a
leadership class perceived to be legitimate-as opposed to providing
compensation for a diffuse history of disadvantage and discrimination.' 5
Much can be said about this description, but several aspects are
particularly relevant.
8. For examples, see ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN
CHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 123-29 (1994) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL POWER].
9. This is true even with highly restrained judges. See, e.g., id. at 138.
10. See CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES, supra note 6, at 139-41.
11. For a fuller account, see ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 128-29 (2001) [hereinafter IMPLOSION].
12. Bix, supra note 1, at 831.
13. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
14. Id. at 343.
15. Id. at 330-32.
First, the description is plainly inconsistent with the design of the
affirmative action program at issue 16 as well as with the actual
intentions of many who instituted such programs and some who still
support them.' 7 Indeed, it is not too much to say that the Court's
description of the state's purposes is in significant measure a fiction,
and-at that-a fiction that has been adopted and sometimes even
internalized by many of the relevant decision makers. At a minimum,
it is clear that the Court's depiction encourages a simplified
understanding of the public purposes involved. Second, the Court's
strong assertions about the educational, social, and political benefits of
affirmative action in higher education, while not implausible, are stated
with far more certainty than is warranted.18 Third, the Court's bold
prediction that in little more than two decades racial preferences will
no longer be necessary to achieve the state's compelling purposes
depends on complex and unknowable contingencies. 19 This prediction,
therefore, must be seen as a misleading assurance that masks the size
and significance of the changes that might follow from the Court's
opinion. The Justices may well believe that deeply entrenched
entitlement programs can be made to vanish with the wave of a judicial
pen, but reality is another matter.
I could go on in this dyspeptic way. I recognize that I have offered
very little empirical evidence for my grim and unwelcome accusations. I
am certain, however, that a full review of the Supreme Court's record
would confirm them;20 this record is significant because, especially in
constitutional cases, the Court represents the apex of legal thought and
practice. Perhaps more importantly, the accusations are straightforward
inferences from commonly acknowledged characteristics of legal
education and practice.
Professor Bix sensibly recommends that legal professionals give
some thought to where we might defer to others.2' Deference,
unfortunately, is unlikely from a profession that has long prized
assertiveness and self-confidence in its membership and that is
accustomed to exercising political power. It is likely, then, that the
legal class will have, as it has had over so many other public issues,
16. Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
17. E.g., James Boyd White, What's Wrong with Our Talk about Race? On
History, Particularity, and Affirmative Action, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1927, 1949 (2002).
18. See Robert F. Nagel, Diversity and the Practice of Interest Assessment, 53
DUKE L.J. 1515, 1522-24 [hereinafter Diversity].
19. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
20. See CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES, supra note 6, at 140-41; JUDICIAL POWER,
supra note 8, at 120-29; IMPLOSION, supra note 11, at 128-29; Diversity, supra note 18, at
1522-24.
21. See Bix, supra note 1, at 823.
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disproportionate influence on current debates about marriage.
Unfortunately, that influence is likely to distort and impoverish public
understanding.
840
